It is natural that in Israel the news of an electoral defeat for Turkey's President is received with a measure of joy. President Erdogan is the man that single-handedly destroyed a perfectly good relationship between the two countries. But it is worth remembering that Erdogan did not lose power. He just lost the majority in parliament and will still be Turkey's king. He also did not lose because of his approach to Israel – in fact, Erdogan has been quite successful in recent years in convincing his fellow Turks that Israel is a threat to Turkey and not the other way around, as recent polls prove. “Asked which country they think poses the biggest threat to Turkey, 42.6 percent of participants chose Israel, while 35.5% said the US”.
Under Erdogan Turkey has had rocky relations with Israel, but its relations with the US are also not great: “Ankara and Washington have been unable to find common ground, even on issues in which both sides profess to share similar interests and goals”, explained an article from about a year ago. Its authors proposed for the US “to rebuild a more constructive partnership with Ankara” by first controlling “its knee jerk instinct to praise Turkey at every opportunity. Better yet, U.S. policymakers should be honest about their concerns regarding the direction of Turkey’s democracy and begin spending more time, effort, and political capital on Turkey’s domestic scene, which has been long neglected as secondary to foreign policy and security issues”.
Erdogan was defeated by Turkey's voters, not smart US policies. Maybe it is good news for Israel, but it’s more likely that it is not. Having spent some hours talking to experts about the meaning of the Turkish elections, I am still not sure that anyone knows where this leads. Will it make Turkey more likely to smooth out its relations with Jerusalem (as some Israeli leaders believe), will it make Erdogan try to use Israel as a tool against which to solidify his base (as others believe), or will it make no difference (as a third group believes)?
Israel was not an issue in Turkey's latest round of elections. And Erdogan did not show during the elections any sign of wanting to amend Turkey's relations with Israel. If he decides to be more accommodating and less confrontational it would not be because of a sudden surge of sympathy but rather for strategic considerations. In recent years, the regional influence of Turkey is in decline, thanks to “an abysmal Turkish record in foreign affairs – certainly far from the objective once set by the current Turkish Prime Minister and former Foreign Minister, Ahmet Davutoglu, of 'zero problems' with the neighbors”.
Turkey has bigger things to worry about than Israel. Rather than having “zero problems” it has “zero relations”. Egypt is upset with Turkey, Iran is chilly, Syria is a mess, the Kurds just proved that the last chapter of the long story of their complicated relations with Turkey has yet to be written. “Arab regimes that managed to ride out the Arab Spring were increasingly annoyed with Erdogan for his advocacy of the Muslim Brotherhood, which they see as a threat to their own movements”.
In the meantime, Iran is getting stronger, and the prospect of a US-Iran thaw is worrying the Turks – as it worries most other Middle East countries. A lifting of sanctions on Iran “could complicate Turkey’s regional policy if it leads to a more assertive Iran”, wrote Gonul Tol of The Middle East Institute. “Ankara is concerned that the deal will free Iran's hand in the Middle East, where it has been vying for power and influence at Turkey’s expense, and that further Iranian influence will bring the Iranian regime closer to Europe and the United States. Iran’s support for Shi‘i militias in Iraq and Syria and the Assad regime have already undermined Turkey’s interests. If an unbound Iran with more resources due to sanctions relief steps up its support in these countries, Turkey might be further marginalized in its immediate neighborhood”.
Thus Turkey, having had trouble with Saudi Arabia in recent years, is making an effort to better the relations with the Saudis. The Saudis currently have closer ties with Israel than ever before because of the common threat of Iran – and the common belief that the Obama administration is pursuing a dangerous policy in the region. They have better relations with the Egyptians, with whom Turkey has also been having trouble.
So Turkey, thinking about Iran, the Saudis, Egypt, and the threat it faces from Syria and Iraq, might have to keep its annoyance with Israel under seal for a while, to advance its more important causes. It will not go back to having great relations with Israel – not under Erdogan. In the meantime, Israel is going to make it relatively easy for Ankara. It will try not to give Erdogan any excuse to reopen the front against Israel. You did not hear one sound of gloating from Israeli officials following Erdogan's defeat, and hopefully you will not hear any.
